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Abstract
This paper presents an integrated theory of money and banking. I address the
following question: when both individuals and banks have private information,
what is the optimal way to settle debts? I develop a dynamic model with micro-
founded roles for banks and a medium of exchange. I establish two main results:
rst, markets can improve upon the optimal dynamic contract at the presence of
private information. Market prices fully reveal the aggregate states and help solve
the incentive problem of the bank. Secondly, it is optimal for the bank to require
loans be settled with short-term inside money, i.e. bank money that expires
immediately after the settlement of debts. Short-term inside money dominates
outside money because the former makes it less costly to induce truthful revelation
and achieve more e¢ cient risk sharing.
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1 Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to integrate the banking theory with the monetary theory.
I address the following question: given that both individuals and banks have private infor-
mation, what is the optimal way to settle debts? This is a fundamental question concerning
any modern economy, where both outside money (at money) and inside money (created
by banks and payments systems) are used to facilitate trades. How to settle debts e¢ -
ciently is critical for the performance of the banking system as a major source of lending.
There are several aspects to this issue. For example, why should debts be settled with
money? Which is a better instrument for settlements, inside money or outside money?
To answer these questions, I develop a dynamic model with micro-founded roles for
banks and a medium of exchange. There are two types of frictions in the economy. The
rst one is lack of intertemporal double coincidence of wants. This, along with spatial
separation and limited communication, gives rise to a role of money as the medium of
exchange. The second friction is two-layered private information. On one hand, agents
have private information about their random endowments. Hence banking has a role in
providing risk-sharing. In particular, bankers can o¤er dynamic contracts to help agents
smooth consumption over time. However, the contracts must be incentive compatible
for individuals to truthfully make payments. On the other hand, bankers have private
information about the uncertain aggregate endowments because they can lter out the
idiosyncratic shocks by aggregating the reports of individual agents. This creates a role
for markets to help solve the incentive problem on the banks side. Indeed, markets at the
settlement stages generate information-revealing prices such that bankers cannot lie about
the aggregate states.
In the model, a banking sector arises endogenously at the beginning of time and provides
dynamic contracts to agents. According to the contract, bankers lend money to agents at
the beginning of a period and agents settle the current debt with bankers as they receive
endowments at the end of the period. Each period, the amount of the loan entitlement of
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an agent depends on the individuals history of past settlements (i.e. his history of reported
endowments) and the sequence of prices at settlement stages.
I establish two main results in this paper. First, markets can improve upon the opti-
mal dynamic contract in the presence of private information on the banks side. Markets
of goods for money at the settlement stages generate prices that fully reveal the aggre-
gate states. This costlessly solves the incentive problem of bankers. However, if debts
are required to be settled with real goods, no market will arise at the settlement stages.
Therefore, debt settlements must involve money in order to e¢ ciently discipline bankers.
Second, the optimal instrument for settlements is the kind of inside money that expires
immediately after each settlement. I call it one-period inside money. Induction of truthful
revelation is less costly with one-period inside money than with outside money or inside
money of any longer durations, which leaves agents better insured against idiosyncratic
risks. Agents cannot benet from holding one-period inside money across periods because it
expires right after a settlement (which happens at the end of a period). In this case, the only
protable way for one to default is to save and consume ones own endowments, which is not
very desirable. In contrast, when outside money is valued, an agent nds it more protable
to default by carrying outside money across periods than saving endowments. The reason
is that the agent can use the hidden outside money to buy his preferred consumption goods.
Thus the gain of default is higher with outside money than with one-period inside money.
The same argument applies to inside money of longer durations. Longer-termed inside
money functions similarly to outside money and involves higher incentives to misrepresent
in periods when the current issue of money does not expire. Therefore, one-period inside
money helps the optimal dynamic contracts implement better allocations. In equilibrium,
more e¢ cient risk-sharing is achieved and welfare is improved.
The key to the above result is the timing of the expiration of inside money, which is
exactly when each settlement of debts is done. Once an agent obtains such inside money for
the settlement, making the payments to the bank is nothing but giving up some worthless
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objects. However, this is not true if outside money is required for settlements. Outside
money will still be valuable to the agent after the settlement stage. Hence the incentives to
default are much stronger with outside money. Not surprisingly, ination of outside money
can be used to correct incentives. With outside money getting less valuable as time goes
on, induction of truthful revelation tends to get less costly.
The model of this paper is built upon Andolfatto and Nosal (2003) and Sun (JME,
forthcoming). Andolfatto and Nosal (2003) construct a model with spatial separation,
limited communication friction and limited information friction. They explain why money
creation is typically associated with banking. Sun (JME, forthcoming) addresses the prob-
lem of monitoring banks with undiversiable risks and shows that there is no need to
monitor a bank if it requires loans to be repaid partly with money. A market arises at the
repayment stage and generates information-revealing prices that perfectly discipline the
bank. This result is strengthened in the current paper of mine, which features an enduring
relationship between bankers and the contracted agents. In contrast to the static contract
studied in Sun (JME, forthcoming), here I show that even the more sophisticated contract
form, dynamic contracts, can use the help of markets to deal with the incentive problem
of bankers.
My work is complementary to the literature that examines the functioning of inside
money and outside money, e.g. Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999), Williamson (2004), He,
Huang and Wright (2005, 2006) and Sun (JME, forthcoming). Cavalcanti and Wallace
(1999) study a random matching model of money and prove that inside money has the ad-
vantage of facilitating trades between bankers and non-bankers because with inside money
bankers are not constrained by trading histories. One of the issues addressed byWilliamson
(2004) is the implication of private money issue for the role of outside money. Inside money
has the advantage of being exible and it responds to unanticipated shocks better than
outside money. He, Huang and Wright (2005, 2006) study money and banking in a money
search model. Bank liabilities are identied as a safer instrument than cash while cash is
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less expensive to hold. In equilibrium, agents may nd it optimal to hold a mix of both.
Sun (JME, forthcoming) establishes that with multiple banks, inside money helps achieve
better outcomes than outside money does. The reason is that the competition of private
monies drives up the equilibrium returns of money and improves welfare. A prohibition on
inside money issue not only eliminates money competition but also triggers free-rider prob-
lems among bankers, which decreases welfare. All the above papers focus on the roles of
inside money and outside money as alternative instruments to facilitate trades. In contrast,
this paper of mine takes a new yet no less important perspective, which is the e¢ ciency of
alternative monetary instruments for settling debts.
This paper develops an integrated theory of money, banking and dynamic contracts,
which is by far a rare e¤ort in the literature. A related previous work is by Aiyagari and
Williamson (2000). They study money, credit and dynamic contracts. In their model,
nancial intermediaries write long-term contracts with consumers. Money is essential be-
cause of limited participation in the nancial market. There are incentive problems due
to private information and limited commitment. With limited commitment, ination has
a large impact on the distribution of welfare and consumption. In contrast, here incentive
problems are caused by private information and aggregate uncertainty. It is essential to
have contracts that require settlements be made with money, in order to cope with the
incentive problems of bankers. Both inside money and outside money are examined to
derive the most e¢ cient payment system for induction of truthful revelation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment
of the model. Section 3 studies banking with outside money. Section 4 examines banking
with inside money. Section 5 explores banking with co-circulation of inside money and
outside money. Section 6 studies the existence and uniqueness of the banking equilibrium.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 The environment
Time is discrete and has innite horizons, t = 0; 1; :::;1. Each period t consists of three
sub-periods, indexed by  = 1; 2; 3. There are three islands indexed by i = a; b; c. Each
island is populated by a continuum of agents who have unit mass, live forever and discount
across time t with factor  2 (0; 1). At any point in time, there are only two islands in
communication, from which agents can freely visit each other. The sequence of communi-
cation at any date t is the following: islands a and b at  = 1, islands b and c at  = 2,
and islands c and a at  = 3. Traveling agents return to their native islands at the end of
the sub-period.
Agents on island i receive endowments of type i goods. Type b goods are endowed at
 = 1 of all t, type c goods at  = 2 of all t and type a goods at  = 3 of all t. For individual
type b and type c agents, the endowment is deterministic at y for all t, where 0 < y < 1.
However, the endowment of a type a agent is stochastic: yt = stt, where st and t are both
random variables and E (yt) = y. Here st is an aggregate shock, which is common to all
type a agents. It is i.i.d. across time according to the probability density function f (s) and
the cumulative distribution function F (s). The variable t is an idiosyncratic shock. It is
i.i.d. over time and drawn in such a way that the law of large numbers applies across type
a agents, according to PDF g () and CDF G (). Both f () and g () have support [0; 1].
Let h (y) and H (y) denote the PDF and CDF of yt, respectively. By Rohatgis well-known
result,1 h (y) =
R 1
y
f (s) g
 
y
s

1
s
ds. The realization of yt, not st or t specically, is private
information of the agent. All agents know about f (s) and g (). The aggregate endowment
of type a goods is not publicly observable.
Endowments are received prior to the arrival of any traveling agent at the start of each
 . All goods are perishable. In particular, type b and type c goods can last for only one sub-
period and cannot be stored across sub-periods. Type a goods, however, can last for two
sub-periods. That is, the endowment of type a goods at  = 3 of t becomes inconsumable
1For the distribution of the product of two continuous random variables, see Rohatgi (1976).
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starting  = 2 of t+ 1.
Agentspreferences are as follows:
Ua = E
0
1X
t=0
tu
 
Cat;b + "C
a
t 1;a

Ub = E
0
1X
t=0
t
 
Cbt;c + C
b
t;b

Uc = E
0
1X
t=0
t
 
Cct;a + C
c
t;c

where the function u : R+ ! R is twice continuously di¤erentiable with u0 > 0 and
u00 < 0, and Cit;j denotes a type i = a; b; c agents consumption of date-t type j = a; b; c
goods. That is, the superscript characterizes the agent and the subscripts describe the
consumption goods. It is given that Ca 1;a = 0. Note that agents can either consume their
own endowments or another particular type of goods. In contrast to type i = b; c agents,
type a agents only consume their own endowments at one sub-period over.2 The preference
parameter " is a very small positive number, i.e. 0 < " 1. That is, type a agents strongly
prefer type b goods to their own endowments.
There is lack of intertemporal double coincidence of wants among various types of
agents. In particular, type a agents would like to trade endowments for type b goods.
However, type b agents do not value type a goods. Type b agents can consume type c
goods, but type c agents do not value type b goods. Similarly for type c and type a agents.
This lack of double coincidence of wants, together with the limited communication friction,
generates a role for money. At the beginning of time, each type a agent is endowed with
M units of storable at objects called outside money. Agents can trade money for goods
other than their own endowments (see Figure 1). With random endowments, type a agents
money incomes will also be random. Banking has a role in providing risk-sharing so as to
2This assumption, along with the assumption that type a goods can last for two sub-periods, is intended
to simplify analysis but is not critical for the main results. As a result of these assumptions, a type a
agents current-period decision of truthfully settling debts is independent of his consumption of type b
goods earlier this period.
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e¢ ciently insure type a agents against the idiosyncratic risks.
[Insert Figure 1]
3 The banking arrangement
A banking sector arises endogenously at the beginning of t = 0. Each type a agent
chooses to be a banker or a non-banker. Bankers o¤er long-term contracts to non-bankers,
to help them smooth consumption over time. Banking is competitive and the bankers
end up o¤ering the same equilibrium contract. Because of the free entry to banking,
the equilibrium contract is such that individual bankers and non-bankers earn the same
expected life-time utility. Without loss of generality, it is convenient to think of bankers
work together as one intermediary, i.e. the bank. Both the bank and non-bankers commit
to the contract. All terms of the contract are public information. Market trades are
competitive.
The bank aims to insure type a agents against the idiosyncratic endowment shocks.
Perhaps the most straightforward banking arrangement is as follows. At each  = 1, the
bank o¤ers money in exchange for the endowments of type b agents and then allocates
type b goods e¢ ciently among type a agents. Then at each  = 3, the bank collects type
a endowments, gives the endowments to type c agents in exchange for money, and then
allocates the rest of the type a goods (if any) e¢ ciently among type a agents.
There are two-sided incentive problems associated with a banking arrangement as de-
scribed above. On one hand, incentive problems arise due to private information at the
individual level. For type a agents, none of the individual endowment, consumption and
money holdings is observable. I focus on incentive compatible allocations. That is, any
banking arrangement must be such that individual type a agents (both bankers and non-
bankers) will truthfully reveal their endowments throughout time. On the other hand, the
bank has the incentive to lie about the aggregate state. Note that the bank collects type
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a endowments and hence gets to know exactly what the aggregate endowment is based on
the reports of individual endowments. In other words, the aggregate endowment becomes
private information of the bank. Therefore, the bank always has the incentive to misrep-
resent the aggregate information unless otherwise disciplined. For example, the bank can
claim an adverse aggregate state and keep the hidden goods to benet its bankers, instead
of transferring the goods to type c and type a agents as it should. The incentive problem
on the banks side is known as the problem of monitoring the monitor.
Note that the bank cannot be actually monitored here because there is no state veri-
cation technology in this model. (Even if there was, state verication would be costly.)
One way to induce truthful revelation of the bank is to design a contract that makes the
banking prots depend on the aggregate state announced by the bank. That is, to reward
the bank (with higher prots) as it announces a high aggregate state and to punish it (with
lower prots) for claiming a low state. However, this mechanism will also be costly because
it distorts the optimal allocations.
In a nite horizon model of banking, Sun (JME, forthcoming) shows that the bank is
perfectly disciplined if loans are required to be repayed with money. This result can be
readily applied here in the current model. Instead of the bank managing all the allocations
of goods, the optimal contract requires that at least part of the allocations are done through
monetary payments (from the bank to non-bankers and vice versa). As agents are obliged
to make monetary payments, they must trade endowments for money rst. I will show
later that markets arise accordingly on island a and generate prices that fully reveal the
aggregate states. As a result, the incentive problem of the bank is solved costlessly.
The bank can issue private money, which is also known as inside money. Between
inside money and outside money, the bank chooses the optimal instrument for settling
debts. In what follows, I study di¤erent banking arrangements which involve alternative
kinds of money. Then I compare the results of the various arrangements and characterize
the optimal banking contract.
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4 Banking with outside money
For now, assume that private money issue is prohibited. The banking contract requires that
monetary payments be made with only outside money. The contract species that (i) at the
beginning of each t  1 the bank pays the non-banker mt 2 R+ units of outside money to
nance his date-t consumption of type b goods; (ii) at  = 3 of each t  0, the non-banker
must sell a fraction z of his endowments yt for outside money and then contributes to the
bank his money income pat zyt and the rest of his endowments (1  z) yt, where pat is the
market price of type a goods for outside money. Then the bank reallocates the collected
type a goods among type a agents. Trivially, a non-bankers date-0 consumption of type b
goods is nanced by his endowment of M units of outside money.
After money payments to non-bankers, the bankers use the residual money balance to
nance their own consumptions of type b goods. Each banker is allocated mBt 2 R+ units
of outside money at the onset of each period. At each  = 3, each banker must also sell
zyt units of endowments and contribute the income pat zyt and the rest of his endowments
(1  z) yt. Then bankers divide the type a goods among themselves after the allocations
to non-bankers.
4.1 Timing of events
Timing of events is illustrated by Figure 2. In any t, at the beginning of  = 1, the bank
allocates money among non-bankers and its bankers. Then type a agents visit island b
and trade money for type b goods. At  = 2, type b agents trade money for type c goods.
At  = 3, rst type c agents trade money for type a goods. Then type a agents make
payments to the bank, which is called the settlement. The bank reallocates the collected
type a goods (if any) among type a agents. The above procedure is repeated for all t.
[Insert Figure 2]
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4.2 The banking equilibrium
Let v0 be a non-bankers expected life-time utility prescribed by the contract. Corre-
spondingly, W0 is a bankers expected life-time utility. Let  2 [0; 1] be the equilibrium
measure of bankers (i.e. the size of the bank) and hence 1   the equilibrium measure of
non-bankers.
Denition 1 A banking equilibrium consists of a contract with the initial promised value
v0 to a representative non-banker and the associated initial value W0 to a representa-
tive banker, an aggregate measure , allocations

Cbt;c; C
b
t;b; C
c
t;a; C
c
t;c
	1
t=0
, market prices
pat ; p
b
t ; p
c
t
	1
t=0
such that: (i) given v0 and , the contract maximizes W0 while delivering
the promised v0; (ii)  clears the market of contracts, that is, W0 = v0; (iii) given prices
and the contract, allocations

Cbt;c; C
b
t;b; C
c
t;a; C
c
t;c
	1
t=0
maximize type b and type c agents
utilities; (iv) prices

pat ; p
b
t ; p
c
t
	
clear goods markets for all t  0.
Before examining the banking contract, it is helpful to rst study the equilibrium
decisions of type b and type c agents. Consider type c agentsbest responses. Taking
(pct ; p
a
t ) as given, a representative type c agent maximizes his expected life-time utility:
max
(Cct;a;Cct;c;dct+1)
E
0
1X
t=0
t
 
Cct;a + C
c
t;c

s:t: patC
c
t;a + d
c
t+1 = d
c
t + p
c
t
 
y   Cct;c

where dct is the type c agents beginning-of-t money holdings. Let
 
Cct;a; C
c
t;c; d
c
t+1

denote
the optimal choices. Similarly, taking
 
pbt ; p
c
t

as given, a representative type b agent
maximizes his expected life-time utility:
max
(Cbt;c;Cbt;b;dbt+1)
E
0
1X
t=0
t
 
Cbt;c + C
b
t;b

s:t: pctC
b
t;c + d
b
t+1 = d
b
t + p
b
t
 
y   Cbt;b

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where dbt is the type b agents beginning-of-t money holdings. Let
 
Cbt;c; C
b
t;b; d
b
t+1

denote
the optimal choices.
The equilibrium prices are pbt = D
a
t =
 
y   cbt;b

, pct = D
b
t=
 
y   cct;c

and pat = D
c
t=Zt for
all t, where Dit is the aggregate money supply to the market by type i agents and Zt = zYt
is the aggregate supply of type a goods to the market when the aggregate endowment is Yt.
It is straightforward to derive that dbt+1 = d
c
t+1 = 0 and C
b
t;b = C
c
t;c = y E [Zt] = (1  z) y
for all t. Neither type b nor type c agents hold money across periods because they receive
a constant stream of endowments.
Now I proceed to study the optimal banking contract. First the bank must decide the
optimal fraction of the aggregate type a endowments to be traded in the market, z. Ex
ante the expected amount of type a goods to be saved and consumed by type a agents
every period is (1  z) y, which is equivalent to consuming " (1  z) y units of type b goods.
Suppose instead of saving it up, the bank also requires the fraction 1  z of the aggregate
endowment to be sold to type c agents. According to Cbt;b, this will get type b agents to sell
(1  z) y more units of goods to type a agents. Since " < 1, it is e¢ cient for the bank to
require z = 1. As a result, type a agents must sell all their endowments to type c agents.
In return, the aggregate consumption of type a agents is maximized and equal to y units
of type b goods every period.
Now let ct denote a non-bankers date-t consumption nanced by the contract. Thus,
ct =
mt
pbt
where pbt is the date-t price of type b goods for outside money and m0 = M .
Without loss of generality, Normalize M = 1. The contract prescribes v0 = E
1P
t=0
tu (ct).
Correspondingly, cBt =
mBt
pbt
denote a bankers date-t consumption of type b goods and hence
W0 = E
1P
t=0
tu
 
cBt

. Again mB0 = 1.
Due to private information of individuals, payments from the bank to a non-banker
must be based on the latters reported history of endowments. Recall that I focus on
incentive compatible contracts. Unless otherwise stated, reported values also represent
true values. Denote a non-bankers history of reported endowments up to period t as
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ht = (y0; y1;    ; yt) 2 [0; 1]t+1. Since zt = zBt = yt for all t, the equilibrium price is
pat =
1
Yt
= 1
st
R 1
0 tg(t)dt
for all t. Hence the market price at the settlement stage ( = 3)
fully reveals the aggregate state, i.e. st = 1patE[t] . In other words, agents can infer the
true aggregate state simply by observing the market price. As a result, the bank cannot
misrepresent the aggregate information to benet its bankers. Denote the price sequence
of settlement stages up to period t as Pt = (pa0; p
a
1;    ; pat ) 2 Rt+1+ . The banking contract
can be formally dened as follows.
Denition 2 A contract  is a constant 0 and a sequence of functions ftg1t=1 where
t : [0; 1]
t  Rt+ ! R+. The consumption stream to a non-banker depends on his reported
history of endowments and the price sequence of settlement stages. That is, c0 = 0 and
ct = t (ht 1; Pt 1) for all t  1.
4.3 The contract design problem
The contract design problem of the bank can be formulated recursively. At the end of
 = 3 of any t  0, non-bankers report current endowments and make the corresponding
payments to the bank. Then the bank makes decisions on future payments and promised
values according to what non-bankers have reported. For any t  1, each non-banker is
identied with a number vt+1, which is his discounted future value starting t + 1 and it
was promised to him by the bank at t   1. The bank delivers vt+1 by nancing a state-
dependent next-period consumption ct+1 and a promised value vt+2 starting period t + 2.
Let the density function t+1 (vt+1) characterize the distribution of the promised values
made by the bank to be delivered starting t + 1. Then t+1 is the state variable for the
banks recursive problem at the end of each period t. Note that the t = 0 consumption of
type b goods is nanced by the agents endowment of outside money. Thus c0 = y. Since
v0 is the lifetime expected value promised by the contract, it follows that v1 = v0   u (y)
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and
1 (v1) =
8><>: 1, if v1 = v0   u (y)0, otherwise : (1)
The objective of the recursive contract design problem is to maximize a representative
bankers expected discounted value Wt+1 starting t+1, while delivering the distribution of
promised values t+1. Dropping time subscripts and letting +1 denote t+1 and +2 denote
t + 2, the banks end-of-period-t objective can be formulated by the following functional
equation:
(TW+1)
 
+1

= max
(cB+1;c+1;v+2)
Z 1
0
Z 1
0

u

cB+1 (y; s)

+ W+2
 
+2
	
g
y
s

d
y
s

f (s) ds
(2)
The maximization problem is subject to the following conditions:
u [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1) (3)
 u

c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + max
2[0;1]

" (y   ey) + (1  ) (y   ey) pa (s)
pb+1

+ v+2 (ey; s; v+1)
8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u cB+1 (ey; s) + max
B2[0;1]

"B (y   ey) +  1  B (y   ey) pa (s)
pb+1

(4)
8 s; 8 ey < y
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
fu [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1)g g
y
s

d
y
s

f (s) ds = v+1; 8 v+1 (5)
+2 (w+2; s) =
Z Z
f(y;v+1):w+2=v+2(y;s;v+1)g
g
y
s

d
y
s

+1 (v+1) dv+1; 8 s (6)

Z 1
0
cB+1 (y; s) g
y
s

d
y
s

+(1  )
Z 1
0
Z V
 1
c+1 (y; s; v+1) g
y
s

d
y
s

+1 (v+1) dv+1 = y; 8 s
(7)
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c+1 (y; s; v+1)  0; 8 y; s; v+1 (8)
cB+1 (y; s)  0; 8 y; s (9)
v+2 (y; s; v+1) 2
  1; V  ; 8 y; s; v+1 (10)
where V = u (y) = (1  ) is the value of the unconstrained rst-best contract that nances
consumption of y units of type b goods every period.
Constraints (3) and (4) are the incentive compatibility constraints for a non-banker
and a banker respectively. Incentive compatibility requires that both bankers and non-
bankers are induced to sell the entire endowments and turn over the entire incomes every
period. Here c+1 (y; s; v+1) and v+2 (y; s; v+1) are a non-bankers next period consumption
and promised value starting the period after the next, given that he is currently promised
v+1, his current endowment is y and the current aggregate state is s. For a banker, cB+1 (y; s)
is his next-period consumption given his current endowment y and the current aggregate
state s.
For both parties, the payo¤ of truthful revelation must be no lower than the payo¤ of
any possible deviation. The right-hand side of (3) is the payo¤ if the non-banker reports
ey < y instead of the truth y. (Note that it is not feasible for an agent to claim ey > y
because he would not have paey > pay units of money to submit to the bank when his
true endowment is y.) The misreported endowment can either be stored for next-period
consumption or be traded for money to buy type b goods. The non-banker chooses , the
fraction of endowment to be stored, to maximize his gain of default. The rst term in the
maximization problem (on the right-hand side of [3]) is the extra consumption of stored
endowment " (y   ey). The second term is the extra consumption of type b goods purchased
with the misreported money, which is (1  ) (y   ey) pa(s)
pb+1
. Similar logic for the right-hand
side of (4). Given prices, an agent optimally chooses  = 0 (or B = 0) if p
a
pb+1
> ". In
equilibrium, pa = 1
sE()
and pb+1 =
1
y
= 1
E(s)E()
. Therefore, we have  = B = 0 provided
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that " < E (s). Now constraints (3) and (4) can both be simplied:
u [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1)  u

c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + (y   ey) pa (s)
pb+1

+ v+2 (ey; s; v+1)(11)
8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u cB+1 (ey; s) + (y   ey) pa (s)pb+1

(12)
8 s; 8 ey < y
Constraint (5) is the promise-keeping constraint. All the values promised to non-bankers
must be delivered. Constraint (6) characterizes the law of motion of the state variable ,
i.e. the distribution of the promised values. Constraint (7) is the resource constraint.
Consumptions of bankers and non-bankers exhaust y units of type b goods every period.
Constraints (8)-(10) dene the choice sets for the choice variables.
Let W  () denote the xed point of T in (2). One can show that W  () is a strictly
increasing, concave function from the fact that T is a contraction mapping that maps the
space of increasing, concave functions to itself. The policy functions fc+1 (y; s; v+1) ; v+2 (y; s; v+1)g,
together with the initial consumption c0 and the associated initial promised value v0, com-
pletely characterize the lifetime contract to a non-banker. Hence, v0 = u (y)+E
1P
t=1
tu (ct).
Similarly, the policy function cB+1 (y; s) pins down the initial value of a representative
banker, W0 = u (y) + E
1P
t=1
tu
 
cBt

. The equilibrium condition v0 = W0 implies that
given ,
v0 = u (y) +W1 (1;) ; (13)
where 1 is given by (1). The above condition denes v0 as a function of , i.e. the
relationship between the initial value and the aggregate measure that clears the market of
contracts. The equilibrium contract must be the one that o¤ers the highest achievable v0.
Therefore, v0 = max
2[0;1]
v0 ().
So far I have set up the contract design problem and describe the banking equilibrium
for the banking contract that requires payments of outside money. The following section
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examines the contract that requires payments made exclusively of inside money. Then I
compare the implications of the two contracts and show that it matters whether inside
money or outside money is used as the settlement instrument.
5 Banking with inside money
5.1 One-period inside money
Now assume private issue of money is permitted. The bank can nance consumptions
through allocations of private money. In this section, I study the banking arrangement
where outside money is not valued and the bank issues a particular kind of inside money,
one-period inside money (OPIM). Namely, it is issued at the beginning of each t  0 and
expires at the end of t after the current-period settlements are done.3 As before, let  be
the equilibrium measure of bankers.
The contract species that (i) at the beginning of all t  0 the bank pays the non-
banker mt 2 R+ units of inside money to nance his date-t consumption of type b goods;
(ii) at  = 3 of all t  0 the non-banker must sell the entire endowment yt for inside money
and then contributes to the bank the money income pat yt, where p
a
t is now the market price
of type a goods for inside money.
The same notations are used as in the previous section. In particular, let ct denote a
non-bankers date-t consumption of type b goods nanced by the contract. That is, ct = mtpbt
where pbt is the price of type b goods for inside money. Denote ht as a non-bankers history
of reported endowments up to period t and Pt as the price sequence of settlement stages
up to period t. The contract and the banking equilibrium are still dened by Denition 1
and Denition 2, respectively.
The objective of the recursive contract design problem by implementing OPIM is given
3The expiration of inside money can be thought of as the object deteriorates after a certain amount of
time. Or we can interpret it as an electronic account whose balance automatically becomes zero at the
prescribed point of time. Accordingly, a new issue of money is simply an amount newly transferred into
the account by bankers.
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by (2) subject to the same constraints as (5)-(10). However, the incentive compatibility
constraints are now di¤erent from (3) and (4):
u [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1)  u [c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + " (y   ey)] + v+2 (ey; s; v+1) (14)
8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u cB+1 (ey; s) + " (y   ey) (15)
8 s; 8 ey < y
Constraint (14) is the incentive compatibility constraint for a representative non-banker
and constraint (15) for a representative banker. The right-hand sides of the constraints
are the payo¤s of default. As required by the contract, type a agents must sell the entire
endowments for inside money. As a result, outside money is not valued by type b or c
agents. Moreover, it is not benecial for a non-banker or a banker to sell any misreported
endowment for inside money because it will expire before period t+1 comes. Thus the only
protable way to default is to save the hidden endowments for next-period consumption.
Since the initial allocation of inside money does not depend on any report of endow-
ments, naturally m0 = 1 and c0 = y. Again, v0 = u (y) + E
1P
t=1
tu (ct). The equilibrium
contract must be the one that o¤ers the highest achievable v0. Index values of banking
with outside money by superscript o and values of banking with one-period inside money
by superscript I. Provided that " < E (s), we have the following propositions:
Proposition 1 W o () < W I () for any given .
Proposition 2 W o0 (v0;) < W
I
0 (v0;) for any given v0 and .
Proposition 3 vo0 < v
I
0 . Moreover, v
I
0 ! V as "! 0 while vo0 is independent of ".
Proofs of Propositions 1-3 are provided in the Appendix.
Propositions 1-2 establish that all else equal bankers can always achieve a higher utility
by o¤ering contracts with one-period inside money than with outside money. Accordingly,
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the bank will choose to implement the former contract. This result is driven by the fact
that the incentives to default are weaker with one-period inside money than with outside
money. When outside money is valued, agents expect it to carry value into the future.
On evaluating the options to default, agents nd it more protable to sell endowments
for outside money than saving them for consumption in the following period (given that
" < E [s]). One-period inside money, however, expires right after settlements. Thus, type
a agents cannot benet from selling the hidden endowments for inside money. The only
benet from default now is to save the endowments for next-period consumption, which is
associated with a much lower utility gain. Thus it is less costly to induce truthful revelation
with OPIM. This allows the bank to achieve more e¢ cient risk-sharing and o¤er higher
equilibrium promised values, which is established by Proposition 3. As a result, welfare of
type a agents is improved by the contract that requires settlement be made with one-period
inside money. The overall welfare of the economy is also improved because the expected
life-time utility of a type b or type c agent is y
1  regardless of their optimal decisions to
trade.
Furthermore, the advantage of the OPIM contract gets stronger as type a agents value
less of their own endowments. As " ! 0, the utility gain of consuming their own endow-
ments becomes negligibly small. With one-period inside money, the incentives to default
diminish because neither saving endowments nor trading endowments for money is prof-
itable. The result approaches the allocations achieved by the unconstrained rst-best
contract. That is, ct (yt 1; st 1; vt) = y, cBt (yt 1; st 1) = y and vt+1 (yt 1; st 1; vt) =
u(y)
1 
for all (yt 1; st 1; vt). However, these policy functions obviously do not satisfy constraints
(11)-(12) of the contract with outside money. With outside money, the incentives to de-
fault are merely driven by the gain of holding outside money to the following period. These
incentives do not go away even if one does not value ones own endowments. Therefore,
there is no way the contract with outside money can implement perfect risk-sharing, not
even when " = 0.
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5.2 Inside Money with Longer Durations
The previous section studies a special kind of inside money, one-period inside money.
Welfare is improved with one-period inside money than with outside money. Now I turn to
inside money of more generalized forms and investigate the associated welfare implications.
The bank issues inside money that has a duration of  periods, where  is an integer and
2   < 1. (Note that if  = 1, inside money never expires, which is equivalent to
outside money in this environment.) That is, each issuance of inside money is made at the
beginning of period t = 0; ; 2;    , and expires at the end of period t =   1; 2  1;    .
Other than that, the bank functions in the same way as in Section 4. Denition 1 and
Denition 2 still apply.
The objective of the recursive contract design problem with -period inside money is
given by
 
TW +1
  
+1; 

= max
(cB+1;c+1;v+2)
Z 1
0
Z 1
0

u

cB+1 (y; s)

+ W +2
 
+2; +1
	
g
y
s

d
y
s

f (s) ds
(16)
subject to the same constraints as (5)-(10). However, instead of constraints (3) and (4),
here the incentive compatibility constraints are formulated by the following:
u [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1)  u [c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + 1 + (1  ) 2] + v+2 (ey; s; v+1)
8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y (17)
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u cB+1 (ey; s) + 1 + (1  ) 2 (18)
8 s; 8 ey < y
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where
t =
8><>: 1, if t =   1; 2  1;   0, otherwise
1 = " (y   ey)
2 = max
2[0;1]

" (y   ey) + (1  ) (y   ey) pa
pb+1

: (19)
Let v0 andW

0 be the initial values of a representative non-banker and a representative
banker, respectively. The bankers recursive contract design problem now di¤ers in periods
with and without expiration of money. In periods with expiration of money, that is,
t =    1; 2   1;    , the bankers problem is similar to the case with one-period inside
money. Since the current issue of money expires at the end of the period, the only protable
way for type a agents to default is to save the endowments for next-period consumption.
The incentive compatibility constraints are equivalent to (14)-(15). In periods without
expiration of money, the problem is similar to the case with outside money. Agents would
prefer to default by holding money into the next period. Accordingly, the IC constraints
are equivalent to (3)-(4). Let v0 be the equilibrium initial promised value with -period
inside money.
Proposition 4 vo0 < v

0 < v
I
0 .
The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 establishes that welfare is the highest with one-period inside money.
Banking with -period inside money takes the second place while the outside money
arrangement ranks the last. With -period inside money, incentives to default in peri-
ods without expiration of money are as strong as with outside money. It does provide
more stringent discipline when there is expiration of money at the end of a period. How-
ever, overall agents are not always as disciplined as with one-period inside money. Not
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surprisingly, incentive compatibility is still more costly with -period inside money than
with one-period inside money. Hence Proposition 4.
6 Co-circulation of inside money and outside money
In this section I study co-circulation of inside money and outside money. Previously, it has
been established that one-period inside money is the best of all kinds of inside money in
that it helps the banking contract achieve the highest welfare level. Therefore, it makes
sense here to focus on the co-circulation of outside money and one-period inside money.
The contract species that (i) at the beginning of all t  0 the bank pays the non-
banker a portfolio of

mIt ;m
o
t
	
to nance his date-t consumption of type b goods, where
mIt 2 R+ is the amount of current period inside money and mot 2 R+ is the amount of
outside money; (ii) at  = 3 of all t the non-banker must sell (1  ) yt units of endowment
for current-period inside money and yt units of endowment for outside money, where
 2 [0; 1] is a constant. Then the portfolio of money incomes
h
pa;It (1  ) yt; pa;ot yt
i
must
be contributed to the bank, where pa;It is the market price of type a goods for date-t inside
money and pa;ot is the market price of type a goods for outside money. Trivially, m
o
0 = 1.
Note that if  = 0, the contract reduces to one with only one-period inside money;
if  = 1, the contract becomes one with only outside money. In this section I focus on
 2 (0; 1). Now dene Pt =

pa;I0 ; p
a;o
0

;

pa;I1 ; p
a;o
1

;    ;

pa;It ; p
a;o
t

2 (R+  R+)t+1 as
the price sequences of settlement stages up to period t. Denition 1 still applies. Let pb;ot
and pb;It be the market prices of type b goods for outside money and date-t inside money,
respectively. Then ct =
mIt
pb;It
+
mot
pb;ot
for all t. Let
n
mB;It ;m
B;o
t
o
denote a bankers beginning-
of-date-t portfolio, where mB;It ;m
B;o
t 2 R+ and mB;o0 = 1. It follows that cBt = m
B;I
t
pb;It
+
mB;ot
pb;ot
for all t.
Denition 3 A banking equilibrium with co-circulation of inside money and outside money
consists of a contract with the initial promised value v0 to a representative non-banker and
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the associated initial value W0 to a representative banker, an aggregate measure , alloca-
tions

Cbt;c; C
b
t;b; C
c
t;a; C
c
t;c
	1
t=0
, market prices
n
pa;It ; p
a;o
t ; p
b;I
t ; p
b;o
t ; p
c;I
t ; p
c;o
t
o1
t=0
such that: (i)
given v0 and , the contract maximizes W0 while delivering the promised v0; (ii)  clears
the market of contracts, that is, W0 = v0; (iii) given prices and the contract, allocations
Cbt;c; C
b
t;b; C
c
t;a; C
c
t;c
	1
t=0
maximize type b and type c agentsutilities; (iv) prices clear goods
markets for all t  0.
In equilibrium, pa;It = 1=
h
(1  ) st
R 1
0
tg (t) dt
i
and pa;ot = 1=
h
st
R 1
0
tg (t) dt
i
for
all t. Obviously in equilibrium,
pa;ot
pa;It
=
pb;ot
pb;It
=
pc;ot
pc;It
=
1  

; 8t:
That is, the value of outside money relative to inside money on island a is given by the
ratio of the amounts of goods required to sell in respective markets. Expecting this, type
b and type c agents value inside and outside monies by the same ratio.
The objective of the recursive contract design problem now is given by (2) subject to the
same constraints as (5)-(10). Instead of constraints (3)-(4), here the incentive compatibility
constraints are formulated by
u [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1) (20)
 u
"
c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + max
2[0;1]
(
" (y   ey) + (1  ) (y   ey) pa;o (s)
pb;o+1
)#
+ v+2 (ey; s; v+1)
8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u"cB+1 (ey; s) + max
B2[0;1]
(
"B (y   ey) +  1  B (y   ey) pa;o (s)
pb;o+1
)#
8 s; 8 ey < y (21)
In fact, the above constraints are equivalent to (3)-(4) because p
a;o
pb;o+1
= y
y
= E(s)
s
= p
a
pb+1
.
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Similar to the case with exclusive circulation of outside money, here agents can default
by selling endowments for outside money. The extra outside money obtained is used to
purchase more type b goods. Each unit of hidden endowment can be converted into p
a;o
pb;o+1
units of next-period type b goods. Given prices, an agent optimally chooses  = 0 (or
B = 0) if p
a;o
pb;o+1
> ". Therefore, provided that " < E (s), we have  = B = 0 for all
equilibrium prices. This is exactly the same result as in the case with outside money only.
Let vco0 denote the equilibrium initial promised value associated with co-circulation of one-
period inside money and outside money. i.e.  2 (0; 1). Hence the following proposition:
Proposition 5 vco0 = v
o
0 .
Proof of Proposition 5 is provided in the Appendix.
As a result, co-circulation of one-period inside money and outside money generates
the same outcome as the sole circulation of outside money. The incorporation of inside
money into the outside money system,  2 (0; 1), has no impact on welfare at all. As
long as outside money is valued, agents incentives to default are just as high with or
without inside money. The reason is that the protability of carrying the misreported
outside money to the succeeding period depends on the ratio of the prices of goods for
outside money, pa;ot =p
b;o
t+1. With a constant outside money supply, the price ratio p
a;o
t =p
b;o
t+1
only depends on the ratio of aggregate market supplies of goods, y=yt. The parameter ,
however, only a¤ects the relative value of outside money to inside money. Therefore, the
incentives are as strong as ever unless outside money is not valued,  = 0.
6.1 Ination and incentives
Thus far a constant money supply has been assumed. Now I relax this assumption and
explore the e¤ect of changes in the money supply on incentive compatibility and welfare.
According to the previous results, the incentives to default are high when outside money is
valued. Moreover, incorporation of inside money into the outside money system does not
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help weaken the incentives in any way. The value of carrying misreported outside money
crucially depends on the ratio of the price of date-t type a goods for outside money relative
to the price of date-t+1 type b goods for outside money, i.e. pa;ot =p
b;o
t+1. A change in outside
money supply can a¤ect pa;ot =p
b;o
t+1 and hence the equilibrium outcomes. In contrast, any
change of the stock of inside money does not have an impact on pa;ot =p
b;o
t+1. Without loss
of generality, the supply of inside money is still assumed to be constant and normalized to
one.
Let Mt be the outside money supply at date t. Assume Mt = (1 + )Mt 1, where
 is a constant. New money is injected as lump-sum transfers to type a agents at the
beginning of t  1. Now  2 (0; 1]. Analogously, ct = m
I
t
pb;It
+
mot+Tt
pb;ot
and cBt =
mB;It
pb;It
+
mB;ot +Tt
pb;ot
for all t, where Tt 2 R are the money transfers and taken as given by agents. Moreover,
mIt ;m
B;I
t 2 R+ and mot ;mB;ot   Tt. Note that now mot and mB;ot can be negative, which
is interpreted as payments from a non-banker to a banker (mot ) or reallocation of money
among bankers (mB;ot ), right after the money transfer is received.
The equilibrium prices are pa;ot =
Mt
yt
and pb;ot+1 =
Mt+1
y
. Revisiting constraints (20)-(21),
recall that given prices, an agent optimally chooses
t ; 
B
t
8>>>><>>>>:
= 0, if p
a;o
t
pb;o+1
> "
2 [0; 1] , if pa;ot
pb;o+1
= "
= 1, otherwise
: (22)
Let vinf 0 denote the equilibrium initial promised value with ination of outside money.
Hence follows proposition:
Proposition 6 If   E (s) ="   1, vinf 0 is constant in  and vinf 0 = vco0 = vo0 ; if
 > E (s) ="  1, vinf 0 is strictly increasing in . Also, vinf 0 ! vI0 as  ! +1.
Provided that " < E (s), Proposition 6 implies that a high enough positive ination rate
can correct incentives to some extent. As a result, outside money is getting less valuable
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as time goes on. If the aggregate endowment on island a is high, outside money is more
costly to obtain. It is even more so considering that it will not be as valuable tomorrow
as it is today. Therefore, for aggregate states above a certain threshold, i.e. st >
E(s)
"(1+)
,
type a agents would choose to save endowments for next-period consumption if they were
to default. Otherwise, they prefer to default by holding outside money across periods.
To sum up, with a positive ination rate, from time to time type a agents may nd
it more protable to default by saving endowments than carrying outside money across
periods. In this case, agents get better disciplined as ination goes higher.
7 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Now it has been established that it is optimal for the bank to implement the contract
with one-period inside money. This section studies the existence and uniqueness of a
banking equilibrium. In the banking equilibrium, the bank makes allocations of money
to nance a type a agents consumptions according to c0 = y and the optimal policy
functions ct (yt 1; st 1; vt;t) ; v

t (yt 1; st 1; vt;t) ; c
B
t (yt 1; st 1;t) for all t  1 that solve
(2) subject to constraints (5)-(10) and (14)-(15). The aggregate measure  clears the
market of contracts such that no one can o¤er a contract that achieves a higher initial
value v0 > v0 that satises W0 (v0) = v0.
Proposition 7 There exists a unique equilibrium initial value v0.
Proposition 7 shows that the banking equilibrium exists and is unique. Note that
the equilibrium outcome is not the constrained e¢ cient (i.e. second-best) outcome unless
 = 0 in the equilibrium. When  = 0, the size of the bank is negligibly small. In this
case, the banks contract design problem is analogous to the e¢ ciency problem addressed
by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and others, in which a planner endeavors to minimize the
expected value of the total resources he allocates. The reason why the constrained e¢ ciency
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is not necessarily achieved here is because in general the minimum resources needed to
attain a given distribution of promised values may not exhaust all the resources available.
In this model, there is no planner as the residual claimant. A utility-maximizing private
banker can prot by retaining any positive residual. The competition in banking reaches
equilibrium until the expected value of being a banker equals the expected value of a non-
banker. The equilibrium outcome is not the second-best if the equilibrium measure of
bankers is not negligible relative to that of non-bankers ( > 0).
However, as established by Propositions 1-3, the main result of this paper is robust
to any banking contract: one-period inside money can help the banking contract achieve
better allocations for any . That is to say, if the second-best allocations can be achieved
in the banking equilibrium, it can only be achieved if the contract requires payments be
made with one-period inside money.
8 Conclusion
This paper has developed an integrated theory of money, banking and dynamic contracts.
The theory is used to evaluate inside money and outside money as alternative instruments
for settling debts. The model has micro-founded roles for both banks and a medium of
exchange. A banking sector arises endogenously and o¤ers dynamic contracts to help agents
smooth consumption over time. According to the contract, bankers lend money to agents
at the beginning of a period and agents settle the current debt with bankers as they receive
endowments at the end of the period. Each period, the amount of the loan entitlement
of an agent depends on the individuals history of past settlements (that is, his history of
reported endowments) and the sequence of prices at settlement stages.. The environment is
characterized by a two-sided incentive problem. At the individual level, agents have private
information about their random endowments. Contracts must be incentive compatible for
individuals to report the true endowments. On the aggregate level, bankers have private
information about the uncertain aggregate endowments. This incentive problem on the
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banks side gives rise to a role for the market to generate information-revealing prices so
that the bank cannot lie about the aggregate states.
I have shown that the optimal instrument for settlements is the kind of inside money
that expires immediately after each settlement. With such one-period inside money, fewer
resources are needed to reward truthful revelation and agents are better insured against
idiosyncratic risks. Agents cannot benet from holding one-period inside money across
periods because it expires right after a settlement (which happens at the end of a period).
As a result, the only protable way for one to default is to save endowments for ones own
consumption. However, when outside money is valued, an agent nds it more protable
to default by carrying outside money across periods than saving endowments. That is,
the gain of default is higher with outside money than with one-period inside money. The
same argument applies to inside money of longer durations. Longer-termed inside money
functions similarly to outside money and involves higher incentives to misrepresent in pe-
riods when the current issue of money does not expire. Therefore, induction of truthful
revelation is the least costly with one-period inside money, which helps the optimal dy-
namic contract implement better allocations. In equilibrium, more e¢ cient risk-sharing is
achieved and welfare is improved.
The key to the above result is the timing of the expiration of inside money, which is
exactly when each settlement of current debts is done. Once an agent obtains such inside
money for the settlement, making the payments to the bank is nothing but giving up some
worthless objects. However, this is not true if outside money is required for settlements.
Outside money will still be valuable to the agent after the settlement stage. Hence the
incentives to default are much stronger with outside money. Not surprisingly, ination of
outside money can be used to correct incentives. With outside money getting less valuable
as time goes on, induction of truthful revelation tends to get less costly.
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Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1-2. Consider the contract problem (2) subject to constraints
(5)-(10) and (14)-(15). Since u is strictly increasing in consumption, constraint (15) implies
that
cB+1 (y; s) > c
B
+1 (ey; s) ; 8 s; 8 ey < y: (23)
Given +1, let
bc+1  y; s; v+1;+1 ; bv+2  y; s; v+1;+1 ;bcB+1  y; s;+1	 be the optimal
policy functions for the banking contract with outside money. That is, they maximize
the objective of (2) subject to constraints (5)-(12). Note that
bc+1; bv+2;bcB+1	 also satisfy
constraints (14)-(15). That is,
u [bc+1 (y; s; v+1)] + bv+2 (y; s; v+1)
 u
bc+1 (ey; s; v+1) + (y   ey) pa (s)
pb+1

+ bv+2 (ey; s; v+1)
> u [bc+1 (ey; s; v+1) + s (y   ey)] + bv+2 (ey; s; v+1) ; 8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y (24)
u
bcB+1 (y; s)  u bcB+1 (ey; s) + (y   ey) pa (s)pb+1

> u
bcB+1 (ey; s) + s (y   ey) ; 8 s; 8 ey < y (25)
The above two strict inequalities hold because " < E (s) and s 2 [0; 1].
Now construct the following policy function such that (15) holds:
ecB+1  y; s;+1 =
8><>: bc
B
+1
 
y; s;+1

+ y; if y  12sbcB+1  y; s;+1 y; if y > 12s , (26)
where y and y are innitely small positive numbers and satisfy yg
 
y
s

= s yg
 
1  y
s

for y
s
 1
2
and all s. Values of s and s exist by the strict inequality of (25). In what fol-
lows, it will be proven that
bc+1  y; s; v+1;+1 ; bv+2  y; s; v+1;+1 ;ecB+1  y; s;+1	 achieve
a higher value of W I+1
 
+1

than
bc+1  y; s; v+1;+1 ; bv+2  y; s; v+1;+1 ;bcB+1  y; s;+1	
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do. First note that given s

Z 1
0
ecB+1  y; s;+1 g ys dys
= 
Z 1=2
0
bcB+1  y; s;+1+ y g ys dys+ 
Z 1
1=2
bcB+1  y; s;+1 y g ys dys
= 
Z 1
0
bcB+1  y; s;+1 g ys dys+ 
Z 1=2
0
yg
y
s

d
y
s

  
Z 1=2
0
s yg

s  y
s

d
y
s

= 
Z 1
0
bcB+1  y; s;+1 g ys dys+ 
Z 1=2
0
yg
y
s

d
y
s

  
Z 1=2
0
yg
y
s

d
y
s

= 
Z 1
0
bcB+1  y; s;+1 g ys dys
Therefore, ecB+1  y; s;+1 and bc+1  y; s; v+1;+1 satisfy constraint (7). Rewrite the objec-
tive of (2) as the following:
W+1
 
+1

= max
(cB+1;c+1;v+2)
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u

cB+1 (y; s)

g
y
s

d
y
s

f (s) ds+
Z 1
0
W+2
 
+2

f (s) ds
(27)
Apply the rst-order Taylor expansion on the rst term of the above with ecB+1  y; s;+1:
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u
ecB+1  y; s;+1 g ys dys f (s) ds
=
Z 1
0
8><>:
R 1=2
0
u
bcB+1  y; s;+1+ y g  ys d  ys
+
R 1
1=2
u
bcB+1  y; s;+1 y g  ys d  ys
9>=>; f (s) ds
=
Z 1
0
8><>:
R 1=2
0

u
bcB+1  y; s;+1+ u0 bcB+1  y; s;+1 y	 g  ys d  ys
+
R 1
1=2

u
bcB+1  y; s;+1  u0 bcB+1  y; s;+1y	 g  ys d  ys
9>=>; f (s) ds
=
Z 1
0
8>>>><>>>>:
R 1
0
u
bcB+1  y; s;+1 g  ys d  ys
+
R 1=2
0
u0
bcB+1  y; s;+1 yg  ys d  ys
  R 1=2
0
u0
bcB+1  s  y; s;+1s yg   s ys  d  ys
9>>>>=>>>>; f (s) ds
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=Z 1
0
8><>:
R 1
0
u
bcB+1  y; s;+1 g  ys d  ys
+
R 1=2
0

u0
bcB+1  y; s;+1  u0 bcB+1  s  y; s;+1	 yg  ys d  ys
9>=>; f (s) ds
>
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u
bcB+1  y; s;+1 g ys dys f (s) ds (28)
The strict inequality holds because (23) implies that u0
bcB+1  y; s;+1 u0 bcB+1  s  y; s;+1 
0 for all y
s
2 0; 1
2

, with an equality if and only if y
s
= 1
2
. As has been established,bc+1; bv+2;ecB+1	 satisfy constraints (5)-(10) and (14)-(15). Note that W+2  +2 takes the
same value for
bc+1; bv+2;ecB+1	 and bc+1; bv+2;bcB+1	 because of the same policy functionbv+2. Thus the second term in (27) also takes the same value for bc+1; bv+2;ecB+1	 andbc+1; bv+2;bcB+1	. The strict inequality in (28) shows that bc+1; bv+2;ecB+1	 achieve a higher
value of W I+1
 
+1

than
bc+1; bv+2;bcB+1	 do. Therefore, bc+1; bv+2;bcB+1	 cannot be the opti-
mal policy functions for the contract problem of banking with one-period inside money. It
follows that W I () > W o () for any given . By (13), W I0 > W
o
0 for any given v0 and .
Proof of Proposition 3. Given , consider two optimal contracts with associated initial
values and consumption streams of
nev0; fectg1t=0 ;fW0;ecBt 	1t=0o and nbv0; fbctg1t=0 ;cW0;bcBt 	1t=0o,
respectively. Suppose fW0  cW0 for any ev0 > bv0. This means the optimal contractnev0; fectg1t=0 ;fW0;ecBt 	1t=0o achieves higher life-time utilities for both bankers and non-
bankers than
nbv0; fbctg1t=0 ;cW0;bcBt 	1t=0o does. Hence the latter cannot be an optimal
contract given , which is a contradiction. Therefore, it must be true that W0 is strictly
decreasing in v0 given .
Given , let vo0 and v
I
0 be the solutions to (13), respectively for the outside money
arrangement and the one-period inside money arrangement. By Proposition 2, we have
vo0 = W
o
0 (v
o
0;) < W
I
0 (v
o
0;). Obviously, v
o
0 6= vI0. Suppose vo0 > vI0, then it follows
that W o0 (v
o
0;) = v
o
0 > v
I
0 = W
I
0
 
vI0 ;

. This is a contradiction because W0 is strictly
decreasing in v0. Thus, vo0 < v
I
0 all given . Then it must be that v
o
0 < v
I
0 because
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v0 = max
2[0;1]
v0 ().
With outside money, the contract design problem is given by (2) subject to constraints
(5)-(12). It is obvious that " does not enter into the problem at all. Therefore, vo0 is
independent of ". With OPIM, " only enters into the incentive compatibility constraints.
Consider any "1 < "2. The values of the right-hand sides of the IC constraints are smaller
with "1 than with "2. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1, one can construct al-
ternative policy functions that achieve a higher value for the problem with "1 than the
optimal policy functions for the problem with "2. (Details are omitted for brevity.) Then
it follows that vI0 strictly increases as " decreases. When " ! 0, the incentives to de-
fault diminish and the optimal contract approaches the unconstrained rst-best contract.
That is, ct (yt 1; st 1; vt) ! y, cBt (yt 1; st 1) ! y and vt+1 (yt 1; st 1; vt) ! u(y)1  for all
(yt 1; st 1; vt), which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is straightforward thatW It+1
 
t+1

is equivalent toW t+1
 
t+1; t

with t = 1 for all t. Given +1, let

c+1
 
y; s; v+1;+1; 

; v+2
 
y; s; v+1;+1; 

; cB+1
 
y; s;+1; 
	
be the optimal policy functions for the banking contract with -period inside money. As
the case with outside money, we have  = 0 for the problem given by (19) and hence
2 > 1. It follows that when  = 0,
u [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1)  u [c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + 2] + v+2 (ey; s; v+1)
> u [c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + 1] + v+2 (ey; s; v+1)
8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u cB+1 (ey; s) + 2
> u

cB+1 (ey; s) + 1 ; 8 s; 8 ey < y
Therefore,

c+1; v+2; c
B
+1
	
satisfy all constraints (5)-(10) and (14)-(15). It follows that
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W It+1
 
t+1
  W t+1  t+1; t for any given  t+1; t. Analogous to the construction in
(26), one can nd other policy functions that achieve a higher value for W It+1
 
t+1

than
c+1; v+2; c
B
+1
	
do, which implies W It+1
 
t+1

> W t+1
 
t+1; t

for any given
 
t+1; t

.
(Details are omitted for brevity.) This in turn implies that W I0 > W

0 for any given v0 and
. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3, one can show that v0 < v
I
0 . By the same
token, W ot+1
 
t+1

is equivalent to W t+1
 
t+1; t

where t = 0 for all t. Similarly, one can
prove that W ot+1
 
t+1

< W t+1
 
t+1; t

for any given
 
t+1; t

and hence W o0  W 0 for
any given v0 and . It follows that vo0 < v

0 .
Proof of Proposition 5. Since constraints (3)-(4) are equivalent to constraints (20)-(21),
the contract problem under co-circulation of inside money and outside money is exactly
the same as under exclusive circulation of outside money. Hence vco0 = v
o
0 .
Proof of Proposition 6. Plugging in the equilibrium prices, (22) becomes
t ; 
B
t
8>>>><>>>>:
= 0, if  < E(s)
"st
  1
2 [0; 1] , if  = E(s)
"st
  1
= 1, if  > E(s)
"st
  1
:
It is straightforward to show that ; B = 0 for any st 2 [0; 1] if   E (s) ="   1. The
contract design problem is the same as given by (2) subject to the same constraints as
(5)-(10) and (20)-(21). Hence vinf 0 is constant in  and v
inf 
0 = v
co
0 = v
o
0 by Proposition
5.
Provided that  > E (s) =" 1, then t ; Bt = 1 if st > E (s) = [" (1 + )] and t ; Bt = 0
if st  E (s) = [" (1 + )] for given st. Thus for high enough aggregate state, it becomes
less protable to default and carry outside money into the future. Now the recursive
contract design problem is given by (2) subject to the same constraints as (5)-(10). Nev-
ertheless, instead of constraints (3) and (4), the IC constraints become the following: for
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s > E (s) = [" (1 + )],
u [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1)  u [c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + 	1] + v+2 (ey; s; v+1) (29)
8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u cB+1 (ey; s) + 	1 ; 8 s; 8 ey < y (30)
and for s  E (s) = [" (1 + )],
u [c+1 (y; s; v+1)] + v+2 (y; s; v+1)  u [c+1 (ey; s; v+1) + 	2] + v+2 (ey; s; v+1) (31)
8 s; v+1; 8 ey < y
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u cB+1 (ey; s) + 	2 ; 8 s; 8 ey < y (32)
where 	1 = " (y   ey) and 	2 = (y   ey) pa;ot
pb;o+1
. Let s = E (s) = [" (1 + )]. Then the objective
of (2) can be rewritten as:
W inf+1
 
+1

= max
(cB+1;c+1;v+2)
8><>:
R s
0
R 1
0

u

cB+1 (y; s)

+ W inf+2
 
+2
	
g
 
y
s

d
 
y
s

f (s) ds
+
R 1
s
R 1
0

u

cB+1 (y; s)

+ W inf+2
 
+2
	
g
 
y
s

d
 
y
s

f (s) ds
9>=>; :
The above problem can be further decomposed into:
W inf+1
 
+1

= W inf+1
 
+1; 	1

+W inf+1
 
+1; 	2

(33)
where
W inf+1
 
+1; 	1

= max
(cB+1;c+1;v+2)
Z 1
s
Z 1
0

u

cB+1 (y; s)

+ W inf+2
 
+2
	
g
y
s

d
y
s

f (s) ds (34)
s:t: (5)-(10) and (29)-(30)
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and
W inf+1
 
+1; 	2

= max
(cB+1;c+1;v+2)
Z s
0
Z 1
0

u

cB+1 (y; s)

+ W inf+2
 
+2
	
g
y
s

d
y
s

f (s) ds (35)
s:t: (5)-(10) and (31)-(32)
Note that the problem in (34) is equivalent to the problem for the exclusive circulation
of one-period inside money, except that the lower bound for s is now s instead of zero.
Similarly, the problem of (35) is equivalent to the problem for circulation of outside money
with a constant money supply, with the upper bound of s being s instead of one. It is
obvious thatW inf+1
 
+1
! W I+1  +1 as s! 0 andW inf+1  +1! W o+1  +1 = W co+1  +1
as s! 1 given any +1.
Consider any s1 < s2. Given +1, let
bc+1  y; s; v+1;+1 ; bv+2  y; s; v+1;+1 ;bcB+1  y; s;+1	
be the optimal policy functions for (33) given s = s2. It is straightforward to see thatbc+1; bv+2;bcB+1	 also satisfy all the constraints for (33) given s = s1. Now construct the
following policy function ecB+1  y; s;+1 such that (30) and (32) hold:
ecB+1  y; s;+1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
bcB+1  y; s;+1 for y 2 [0; s] ; if s 2 [0; s1) [ (s2; 1]8><>: bc
B
+1
 
y; s;+1

+ y for y 2

0; 1
2
s

bcB+1  y; s;+1 y for y 2  12s; s ; if s 2 [s1; s2]
where y and y are innitely small positive numbers and satisfy yg
 
y
s

= s yg
 
1  y
s

for y 2 0; 1
2
s

and s 2 [s1; s2]. Values of y and y exist by the strict inequality of (30)
given bcB+1  y; s;+1 for s 2 [s1; s2]. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1, it can be
shown that given s = s1,
bc+1  y; s; v+1;+1 ; bv+2  y; s; v+1;+1 ;ecB+1  y; s;+1	 achieve
a higher value of W inf+1
 
+1

than
bc+1  y; s; v+1;+1 ; bv+2  y; s; v+1;+1 ;bcB+1  y; s;+1	
do. This implies that W inf+1
 
+1

(s) is strictly decreasing in s for any given +1. Hence
by the same argument of the proof of Proposition 4, vinf 0 is strictly decreasing in s. Note
that s is strictly decreasing in . Thus vinf 0 is strictly increasing in .
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Proof of Proposition 7. Consider the following policy functions: c+1
 
y; s; v+1;+1

=
cB+1
 
y; s;+1

for any given v+1 and +1. Trivially, v+2
 
y; s; v+1;+1

= 1
1 Ey;s

u

cB+1
 
y; s;+1
	
.
Given c+1 and v+1, cB+1 solves the following maximization problem:
W+1 = max
cB+1

1
1  
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u

cB+1 (y; s)

g
y
s

d
y
s

f (s) ds

(36)
subject to
u

cB+1 (y; s)
  u cB+1 (ey; s) + " (y   ey) ; 8 s; 8 ey < y (37)Z 1
0
cB+1 (y; s) g
y
s

d
y
s

= y; 8 s (38)
Since y = s, the above problem can be rewritten as
W+1 = max
cB+1

1
1  
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u

cB+1 (; s)

g () d () f (s) ds

(39)
subject to
u

cB+1 (; s)
  u hcB+1 e; s+ "s   ei ; 8 s; 8 e <  (40)Z 1
0
cB+1 (; s) g () d () = y; 8 s (41)
It is straightforward to show that the solution to this problem cB+1 exists and is unique. The
policy functions

c+1; v+2; c
B
+1
	
imply that v0 = W 0 (v0). This is true for any  2 [0; 1].
By denition, the policy function cB+1 is optimal given

c+1; v+2
	
and hence v0. But
c+1; v+2
	
may not be the optimal policy functions to achieve v0. If they are optimal,
then it is trivial that the banking equilibrium exists and is unique. Suppose they are
not optimal. Let fctg1t=0 be the sequence of consumptions achieved by c0 = y and policy
functions

c+1; v+2
	
for all t  0. Since the goal of the bank is to maximize the life-time
expected utility of a banker, it chooses functions c+1 and v+2 to minimize the expected
value of the total resources it allocates to the non-bankers for any promised value v0.
Since

c+1; v+2
	
are not optimal by assumption, there must be a less costly sequence
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of allocations other than fctg1t=0 that achieves v0. Put it another way, there must be
allocations that achieves a higher value thanW 0 for a representative banker while delivering
the promised v0. Formally, it must be true that W0 (v0) > W 0 andW0
 
v
0
0

= W 0 for some
v
0
0 > v0. This holds for any . Let ' (v0) = W0 (v0). The Theorem of the Maximum
delivers ' as a continuous function on

v0; V

, where V = u(y)
1  is the value achieved by
the rst-best contract. Recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that given , the function
W0 (v0) is strictly decreasing in v0. Therefore, it must be true that there exists a unique
v0 2

v0; V

that satises W0 (v0) = v0 for any given . The uniqueness of the equilibrium
value v0 follows because v

0 = max
2[0;1]
v0 ().
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Figure 1 Monetary Trades
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Figure 2 Timing of Events
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